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Abstract—In late 2017, a sudden proliferation of malicious
JavaScript was reported on the Web: browser-based mining
exploited the CPU time of website visitors to mine the cryp-
tocurrency Monero. Several studies measured the deployment
of such code and developed defenses. However, previous work
did not establish how many users were really exposed to the
identified mining sites and whether there was a real risk given
common user browsing behavior. In this paper, we present a
retroactive analysis to close this research gap. We pool large-scale,
longitudinal data from several vantage points, gathered during
the prime time of illicit cryptomining, to measure the impact on
web users. We leverage data from passive traffic monitoring of
university networks and a large European ISP, with suspected
mining sites identified in previous active scans. We corroborate
our results with data from a browser extension with a large user
base that tracks site visits. We also monitor open HTTP proxies
and the Tor network for malicious injection of code. We find that
the risk for most Web users was always very low, much lower
than what deployment scans suggested. Any exposure period was
also very brief. However, we also identify a previously unknown
and exploited attack vector on mobile devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2017, the filesharing site Piratebay was re-
ported to engage in browser-based mining of the Monero
cryptocurrency by including JavaScript and Web Assembly
(WASM) code from the Coinhive mining pool. Due to Mon-
ero’s cryptographic design, such mining was viewed as a
possible revenue model for site operators. Dozens of pool op-
erators and mining variants emerged soon (see Figure 1). The
term cryptojacking was soon coined for sites that exploited
their visitors’ CPU without informing them; attackers even
compromised websites [1] and exploited known weaknesses
of the Drupal web framework [2], [3] to plant mining code.
Starting in late 2018, a number of researchers investigated
the deployment of cryptomining code on websites and the
operator ecosystem [4], [5], [6], [7]. While their results are
not quite consistent, they still demonstrated that deployment
was occurring on thousands of websites or more.
These previous lines of research left some important ques-
tions unanswered, however, as the methods used were almost
exclusively short-term, active scans of parts of the web.
These are well-suited to gauging deployment, but they cannot
establish if users were actually exposed to mining as they do
not measure how many and how often users encounter mining
sites. This requires passive observation of user behavior to
understand the actual risks. The above methods also miss out
on attack vectors that are known to be of practical relevance,
such as the injection of mining code by HTTP proxies [8].
In this paper, we pool existing datasets from several research
groups and vantage points that were created during 2018-2019.
We present a retrospective, longitudinal view of user exposure
to browser-based cryptocurrency mining and investigate vari-
ous forms of exposure due to the injection of mining code by
intermediary nodes. Our main contributions are as follows:
1) User exposure. We measure user exposure by leveraging
passive traffic monitoring, using monitoring stations in several
North American research and education networks, a large
European mobile ISP and an existing Chrome extension with a
large user base. Our measurements are longitudinal. We show
that the problem was by far not as often experienced by users
as previous deployment measurement suggested: users were
rarely, if at all, ever exposed.
2) Alternative attack vectors. We check the ecosystem of open
proxies for malicious injection of cryptomining code, testing
up to 250k proxies per day, and monitor exit nodes on the Tor
network for injections. We show that the attack vector was
real and exploited, but fortunately most users were not at risk.
3) Unknown attack vector. We identify an unknown attack
vector in our passive data and trace it to manufacturers and/or
suppliers of cheap mobile phones who upload apps without
user consent. The apps cause cryptocurrency to be mined on
the phones.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We give
an overview of related work and position our contribution in
Section II. Section III presents our methodology and discusses
ethical considerations. We present our results in Section IV and
discuss them in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous work on in-browser mining focused nearly exclu-
sively on deployment, campaigns, defenses, and estimates of
revenue. To the best of our knowledge, passively obtained data
is only used in [9] in a 30,000-ft estimate to show that some
users were affected; however, this is not put into context of978-3-903176-27-0 ©2020 IFIP
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Figure 1. Timeline of key events during the rise of cryptojacking. Circle size is a rough measure of the number of reports in the respective period.
the overall user base. Injection of mining code by proxies,
Tor nodes or mobile phone suppliers has not received any
attention. Hence, our work is complementary to previous work.
Table I visualizes this and summarizes previous contributions.
Previous work used various active detection methods and
counted incidents quite differently. This makes it very difficult
to compare between the authors. Some authors investigated
only the landing pages of websites [4]; others followed internal
links [5], [9]; others even counted links to external sites as a
mining occurrence [6]. Some authors used static detection and
pattern matching in their scans [4], [9], others used dynamic
code analysis and/or hardware monitoring [5], [7]. Many
investigated only domains from Alexa Top1m lists on single
or very few occasions, although the high variability of this
data source (up to 50% churn per day) is well established [10].
Others again sampled a large part of domains from public DNS
zonefiles [4], [9]. It is usually impossible to give a reliable
estimate how many users visited the respectively identified
mining sites.
The authors of [6], [7], [5], [4] carried out active scans of
Alexa lists. Detection is mostly based on dynamic analysis:
monitoring the creation of Websockets, use of the Stratum
protocol, and profiling the call stack and JavaScript worker
threads. These methods have high accuracy. However, they are
not applicable in a passive measurement because the affected
machine can only be monitored in terms of network traffic.
The publications most closely related to ours are probably
the ones by Konoth et al. [5] and Bijmans et al. [9], which
use the same toolset (using dynamic detection of the use of
Websockets and the protocol to communicate with a mining
pool). Bijmans et al. also analyze the nature and purpose of
mining sites; this was out of scope for our study. Konoth
et al. find that static string matching is already sufficient
to detect 93% of mining sites. Dynamic detection is useful
to eliminate false positives, however. They also propose a
defense based on measuring the CPU cache and identifying
cryptographic primitives in the call stack. They determine
an incidence rate of 0.07% for landing pages and 0.17%
when including internal links. Bijmans et al. report 0.01%
in a smaller scan but 0.07% for domains on the Alexa list,
concluding that Alexa scans overestimate the incidence rate.
Hong et al. and Kharraz et al.’s tools produce deviating results
(0.50%-0.87% incidence), but they count links to external
sites as an incidence relating to the investigated site. Rueth
et al.’s study [4] is quite different: it uses pattern matching for
detection and dissects the Coinhive link-forwarding service.
III. METHODOLOGY
We use passive measurements to obtain an accurate picture
of user exposure. Some of our passive measurements rely on
input from active scans and classifications from blocklists to
identify mining sites. We support open science and make code
and non-privacy sensitive data in this paper available:
https://github.com/retrocryptomining
A. Deriving Classifiers
Samples. Mining code consists of two parts: a part responsible
for the mining (WASM or, rarely, custom encodings) and
helper code for configuration. We collected both helper and
mining code, including for those mining pools that require
manual user opt-in. We collected 78 samples between 2017-10
and 2018-07, from affected sites and by creating accounts with
mining pools. This was a manual, iterative process following
reports on the Web (especially [11]). We summarize our
collection in Table II. In line with previous work, we find
two algorithms dominate: Cryptonight and JSECoin. Mining
pools use different Cryptonight implementations; however a
significant number of samples are just variants of the imple-
mentations by Coinhive, Authedmine, and CryptoLoot. Some
implementations use a custom byte encoding, not WASM.
During our collection period, we noted a shift to heavy obfus-
cation, especially in the more recent Cryptonight implementa-
tions by CoinNebula and DeepMiner. We apply deobfuscation
to verify a sample is mining code. For Authedmine, we
develop a custom reverser. DeepMiner encrypts its code with
AES; the key is located in the JavaScript itself. For other
implementations, we apply partial evaluation using the open-
source tool JStillery. Owing to our long collection period and
the fact that most implementations are closely related variants
of Cryptonight, we believe our samples provide excellent
coverage of most cryptocurrency mining in use in 2018-2019.
Blocklists. We use classifications from five important block-
lists as further input. All are available on Github or via
the respective browser extension: NoCoin, coinhive-block,
coinhive-blocker, crypto-miner-blocker, and MinerBlock. We
Table I
COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK. HALF CIRCLES REFER TO METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS DOCUMENTED IN EACH RESEARCH PAPER.
Contributions Methodology Classifiers in scans Incidence %
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Bijmans et al. [9] G# #    # G#  Top1m; 49m 2018-12–2019-01 # # #  # G# #   # 0.01-0.07%
Hong et al. [6] # #    # #  Top100k 2018-04  # # # # # #  # # 0.50-0.87%
Kharraz et al. [7] # #   # # #  Top1m; 600k 2018-02–2018-10   # # # # #   # 0.59%
Konoth et al. [5] # #     #  Top1m 2018-02  # #  # G#    # 0.07-0.17%
Ru¨th et al. [4] # #  G#  # #  Top1m; 12m 2018-01–2018-05 #  #   # # #  # 0.08%
This work   G# # # #   Top1m; 265m 2018-01–2018-11 #     # # # #  0.02-0.12%
Table II
OUR SAMPLES BY FAMILY AND ORIGIN. HELPER CODE COUNTED ACROSS
FAMILIES.
Family/type Samples (obfuscated) Sources
Cryptonight family. . .
Authedmine 6 (6) authedmine.com; affected sites
Coinhive 9 (0) coinhive.com, npm; affected sites
Cryptoloot 10 (8) Cryptoloot (Github); affected sites
Other 37 (27) respective pools; affected sites
JSECoin 2 (0) JSECoin; affected site
Helper code 14 (1) respective pools; affected sites
consolidate these from 2017-11 to 2018-07. We eliminate over-
ambitious regular expressions (e.g., single-letter filenames).
The regular expressions we deem suitable for detection cover
URLs of mining domains, URLs of Websockets, JavaScript
filenames, and a small number of highly specific keywords.
Further input. The authors of [5] provide us with a list of
mining sites they identified in 2018-02.
From our samples and regular expressions, we derive a
number of classifiers. Two forms of classifiers are for static
analysis in active and passive measurements. One classifier
can be used to inspect JavaScript code at runtime.
C1: pattern matching. Classifiers in this category are string
patterns for both obfuscated and non-obfuscated mining code,
including various alternative encodings of WASM. In 2018-01,
there are 45 classifiers in this category (one was later found to
be redundant). Our set grows to 58 in 2018-03 and to 364 in
2018-07. This was due to fast growth of the blocklists, which
included ever longer lists of proxy domains for Websockets,
used by mining scripts to avoid detection.
C2: signatures. We implement MD5, fuzzy hashing1, and Yara
signatures2 to identify and differentiate between variants of
mining scripts.
C3: namespaces. We find that global variables are commonly
used in mining code to simulate namespaces, with variable
names often unique to a family of related implementations.
We use this for classification in our browser extension.
1github.com/DinoTools/python-ssdeep
2github.com/VirusTotal/yara
An obvious limitation of our approach is that we can
only detect known samples and closely related derivates that
preserve the key characteristics we extracted. We argue that
this limitation should be of little relevance for this study due
to our broad coverage.
B. Active Scanning of Domains
We use scans of landing pages to validate the coverage and
accuracy of our classifiers and create input data for our passive
measurements. Our scanner (cm-screener) is custom-built and
written in Go. We pick scan targets from two sources. We scan
domains on the Alexa Top 1m, with a fresh list downloaded
before each scan. We also reuse the methodology from [12].
We collect domains from ICANN’s CZDS (czds.icann.org),
Certificate Transparency logs, and the .com, .net, .org zones.
We add domains from the Umbrella and Majestic top lists. We
resolve all domains with massdns and scan IP addresses with
zmap to eliminate unreachable domains.
Initally, we use cm-screener to test landing pages for the
presence of links to JavaScript mining code, in particular links
to the respective mining pools. This was a very common de-
ployment pattern in the early phase of in-browser mining. Such
a scan can screen nearly 100m domains in under 24h. With
deployment diversifying and attempting to evade detection,
we extend the scanner to parse landing pages and retrieve
all JavaScript (inline and linked) and match the code against
our classifiers. The parsing is considerably slower; we limit
ourselves to one full scan of the Alexa list and just under 20m
random domains from our larger input list. We evaluate our
detection rate by statistical sampling and determine the sample
proportion of true and false positives (we count commented
mining code as a false positive). We show in Section IV-A
that this identifies mining sites with the accuracy required for
our passive measurements.
C. Passive Monitoring
Our passive monitoring is carried out on traffic data from
research and education networks and a mobile ISP.
Research and education networks. We have access to data
from a long-running project [13] monitoring TLS network
connections from several North American research and ed-
ucation networks with more than 100k users. This includes
campus networks and student accomodation networks. We
use the Server Name Indication (SNI) of TLS to determine
the destination domain of a connection. This allows us to
identify HTTPS connections to suspected mining domains and
Websocket proxies.
Mining sites cause the browser to open Websocket con-
nections to mining pools and proxies. We check for these
using the Websocket URLs from category C1. The Websocket
protocol is an in-band upgrade to HTTPS, i.e., they are not
directly inferable. However, mining pools typically host their
Websocket endpoints on subdomains beginning with ws, e.g.,
ws1.coinhive.com, and most code samples we collect follow
this pattern and connect to the proxies provided by mining
pools. Bijmans et al. independently confirm this in [9]; the
use of other proxies is rare. Consequently, we count only
connections to domains of this format and to the pools known
to us as a mining connection.
We inspect data from our passive monitoring going back to
2015 and ending in 2018-11, 280 billion connections in total.
We pick up the first mining-related connections (to Coinhive)
in 2017-08; this was a month before the first reports.
Mobile ISP. We inspect our samples and find that very few
deactivate mining on mobile browsers. Concluding that users
of handheld devices should also be affected by in-browser
mining, we leverage our access to data from a large European
mobile ISP with tens of millions of subscribers in one country
to identify mining activity. We collect passive traces and
summary statistics from 2018-01 to 2018-08. Specifically, we
leverage two separate data sources. The first is a transparent
middlebox used by the ISP to optimize mobile traffic. The
second is a device database linking a device ID (IMEI) to
a specific device model, OS, and manufacturer. We refer to
entries in our first source as ‘transactions’. Note that our
methodology does not allow us to identify tethering.
We provide the ISP with a list of regular expressions, built
from our classifiers in C1 of 2018-01. The expressions cover
Coinhive, JSECoin, and several providers using Cryptonight.
They also identify Websocket endpoints and complete URLs of
JavaScript mining code. The ISP builds traffic capturing rules
based on these and applies them on our behalf. For HTTP, we
match full URLs. For HTTPS, we match the domain name
in the SNI. We collect several TB of transactions per day,
with the following information for each matching transaction:
timestamp, anonymized subscriber ID, URL, device model,
and transaction size. Once we have obtained our statistical
information, the original data is deleted by the ISP. One
limitation to note is that we cannot update our list of regular
expressions. However, all important mining providers (e.g.,
Coinhive, Authedmine, and JSECoin) are covered thanks to
our collection of samples.
D. Alternative Attack Vectors: Tampering with Connections
We explore two alternative attack vectors that have not been
investigated before.
Open proxies. Open web proxies relay and pseudonymize
HTTP connections free of charge. Typical use cases include
hiding the geographic origin and accessing geo-blocked con-
tent. The authors of [14] and [8] showed that such proxies
may tamper with connections and modify content to inject
advertisements and malware. We test whether open proxies
inject mining code, following the methodology published in
[8]. We use an array of scanners and aggregator lists to identify
reported open proxies. Between 2017-10 and 2018-08, we ac-
cess 250k reported open proxies per day. Of these, we classify
only 25 826 as truly operational, i.e., actually performing any
proxying. We set a timeout of 60s to eliminate slow proxies;
this results in 15 892 proxies we test for injections. We check
for content manipulation by requesting a crafted bait webpage
and comparing the received page with the original. We use
classifiers from C1 and C2 to identify the kind of injection.
We manually inspect and verify all results.
Injection in Tor. Tor hides client IP addresses by forwarding
data through multiple routers in the network. The authors
of [15] showed that some last hops (the exit nodes) may also
tamper with traffic. We monitor Tor exit nodes daily from
2017-12 to 2018-08. Each day, we retrieve the list of active
exit nodes from Tor directory servers. Testing each exit node,
we download static, small bait pages pages via HTTP and
compare them to versions served without Tor. Due to the
early start, we use only 11 strings as classifiers. However,
we choose them to ascertain breadth, including keywords for
Coinhive and JSECoin. We manually verify all incidents of
non-matching sites.
E. Understanding User Visits to Mining Sites
We leverage a Chrome extension deployed to investigate
the ecosystem of open proxies [8]. Our extension tracks
connections made via benign open proxies. It offers users
to choose a proxy from a list of operational proxies that is
continuously updated. Proxies that modify content are never
added to this list. There are currently 7940 installations of
this extension, with about 1400 active users per week. About
200GB traffic per month are inspected. To analyze whether
proxy users are affected by cryptocurrency mining activity,
we instrument the extension to use classifiers from category
C1. We update the used classifiers as our list in category C1
grows. As the extension’s purpose is to prevent users from
routing their traffic via tampering proxies, any injection that
is still found must come from the visited site. This gives
us useful information about users accessing such sites. In
2018-05, we add the detection of mining libraries (C3) as the
browser extension gives us the necessary access for this form
of dynamic analysis. We analyze our dataset until 2018-08,
when we deactivate the analysis functionality.
F. Ethical Considerations
All our measurement methods have been cleared by the
responsible entities and IRBs at each participating institution.
This includes all institutions contributing data to our pas-
sive measurement of research and education networks. The
latter data collection also excludes or anonymizes sensitive
information such as client IP addresses before we see it.
Data collection and short term retention at network middle
boxes of the mobile ISP is in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the ISP and the local regulations. These
terms include data processing for research and publications as
allowed usage of collected data. We only extract aggregated
information and have no access to any personally identifiable
identifiers. The Chrome extension to analyze proxy user traffic
has a clear privacy policy enabling data collection and analysis
for research and publication purposes. Analysis happens on
the fly; no payloads are collected. Only anonymous data is
collected; no personally identifiable information is included.
Our active scans follow best practices such as rate limiting,
blacklisting, and maintaining informative rDNS pointers.
IV. RESULTS
We first present our results from the screening scans, which
support our passive monitoring and allow us to have confi-
dence in our classifiers. We then present results supporting our
conclusion that very few users were exposed to cryptocurrency
mining on the web, and only for very short periods of time.
We discuss this in depth in Section V.
A. Providing input from active scans
We list our screening scans in Table III. For every suspected
mining domain, cm-screener stores page dumps.3 We take a
simple random sample of size 250 (which meets the success/-
failure condition for binomial experiments) from each scan
and give the sample proportion of true positives (pˆ) together
with 95% confidence intervals.
In 2018-01, we identify 240 of the 250 samples as true
positives of sites loading mining code that would execute in
the browser. In 5 further cases, the mining code had been
commented; in five more cases our hits are false positives.
This corresponds to a true positive rate of 0.95, with a 95%
confidence interval of (0.94, 0.98). The vast majority of the
240 cases are inclusions of Coinhive. For the scans in 2018-03
(Alexa and large-scale scan of 265m domains), we find very
similar values. The scans in 2018-07, however, produce a
lower true positive rate. Inspecting our results, we note an
overreach in blocklist entries. Removing just three entries
reduces the false positives by nearly half. On the whole,
however, our incidence rates are remarkably consistent with
related work. With pˆ = 0.96, the identified mining sites
from the Alexa scan in 2018-01 correspond to an estimated
incidence rate of 0.12. For 2018-03, we obtain 0.09. We
hence conclude that our classifiers produce results that are
consistent with other authors. We do not eliminate the false
positives of 2018-07 as they are not damaging to our passive
measurements. As we show in Section IV-B, user exposure is
so low that checking for too many suspected mining sites in
our passive monitoring has no further impact.
3Due to a technical issue, in a small number of cases only the mining code
was stored to disk. We used the Wayback machine to confirm it had been
included in the HTML.
B. Passive Monitoring
We analyze our data from passive observations of network
traffic and contrast the results from research and education
networks with those from the mobile ISP.
1) Research and education networks: We first inspect all
connections in our entire observation period for mining-related
domains to which Websocket connections are made. We use
the Websocket domains/URLs from our samples and blocklists
as input (C1). Over the entire period, we identify only 1.4m
connections (out of billions) to a total of 398 domains. The
domain names differ only in the digits following the ws prefix.
Going through these manually and grouping them together, we
arrive at only 15 distinct domains to which 995k connections
are made. Recall that category C1 is based on real, verified
samples and entries from blocklists, with more than 200 string
patterns that identify Websocket endpoints. Most of these
receive no traffic at all. The amount of network traffic going to
known Websocket endpoints must be described as minuscule.
The finding implies that none of these sites belong to the
popular domains on the Web that attract many users.
Grouping endpoints for mining pools and proxies together
under the term dropboxes, we list the top domains by number
of connections in Table IV. The Coinhive mining pools, i.e.,
including Authedmine, dominate by number of connections.
More than 85% of our dropbox connections terminate there.
Coinhive. Focusing on Coinhive connections only, Figure 2
shows the longitudinal development over time. The percentage
of connections per day is very low. In absolute numbers, the
peaks are at 22k connections per day; typically, this number is
much lower at several hundred. We observe most connections
after 2017-09, when activity picks up rapidly and peaks a first
time in 2017-12, when in-browser mining was in the news.
There are two more peaks in 2018-04 and 2018-05. They
coincide with the widely reported vulnerability in the Drupal
CMS (‘Drupalgeddon’) known to be exploited at that time
for cryptomining [2], [3]. According to coinmarketcap.com,
there was also a short price surge around this time. We see
an ever lower level of connections in the second half of the
year—at most a few thousand connections per day. We believe
the reasons to include Drupal updates, more comprehensive
blocklists, and a general decline of the cryptojacking practice
due to lower prices. Note that our sample collection is ever-
growing. In 2018-07, it already contains many of the newer,
alternative mining pools.
Casting a wider net. We check how many identified mining
domains appear in our scans and in our passive observations.
In the large scan of 2018-03, which covered 265m domains,
we identify 41 359 mining domains. We search for these in our
passive data, with a window reaching back 30 days. In the 8
billion connections of this 30-day window, we find only 4202
connections to just 441 of the 41 359 domains. There is a long-
tail distribution: ignoring Coinhive and Authedmine, which
host the mining code that is often linked to, we find mostly
connections to movie streaming sites (roughly 30%). These are
not the known, clearly legitimate providers but rather sites that
Table III
SCREENING SCANS. pˆ IS THE SAMPLE PROPORTION OF true positives WE DETERMINED. WE GIVE A 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL.
Method Date C1 Input Linked JS Suspected mining sites pˆ (TP) 95%-CI pˆ (TP)
cm-screener v1 31 Jan 2018 45 Top1m - 1239 0.96 (0.94, 0.98)
cm-screener v1 12 Mar 2018 58 Top1m - 994 0.95 (0.93, 0.98)
cm-screener v2 29 Jul 2018 364 Top1m 4.4m 742 0.78 (0.73, 0.84)
cm-screener v1 14–17 Mar 2018 58 265.3m - 41 359 0.94 (0.91, 0.97)
cm-screener v2 28 Jul–7 Aug 2018 364 19.7m 30.0m 4398 0.82 (0.77, 0.87)
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Figure 2. Black: Coinhive connections, passive measurement (%). Blue
(dotted): Monero price.
Table IV
TOP 10 DROPBOXES BY CONNECTIONS.
Domain Conns
ws.coinhive.com 760 164
ws.rocks.io 83 793
ws.authedmine.com 56 956
ws.coin-hive.com 35 068
ws.pzoifaum.info 19 135
ws.crypto-loot.com 17 683
ws.coin-have.com 7548
ws.staticsfs.host 3553
ws.aalbbh84.info 3245
ws.hemnes.win 3060
seem to target the ‘grey area’ of streaming where the illegality
of consumption of such streaming is unclear, disputed, or at
least not acted upon. Just nine domains account for more than
half the connections. Almost a third of domains receive just
one connection. We repeat the analysis for the results of the
smaller scans in 2018-01 and 2018-07. We find 156 domains
in 49 742 connections (out of 5.4 billion in the preceeding 30
days) for 2018-01. For 2018-07, we find 44 domains in 1832
connections out of a total of 2.5 billion connections in the
30-day window.
The clear picture emerging from our observations is that
of a striking discrepancy between deployment and actual
user exposure. The long-tail distribution offers evidence that
blocklists in browsers and network gateways, while definitely
incomplete, can provide a much better protection than related
work assumed. We return to this in Section V.
2) Mobile ISP: The data from our mobile ISP covers a
much larger user base and a long observation window (half
a year). The picture that our data establishes is entirely
consistent with our network monitoring of research networks.
We identify 91m transactions over six months as mining-
related. Of tens of millions of subscribers, only 1.3m unique
users are ever affected. Coinhive dominates: we identify 30m
transactions as access to Coinhive (860k unique users). Fig-
ure 3(a) shows the daily number of unique users who access
domains that we have reason to suspect of hosting mining
code. On average, 15k devices access these per day (out of tens
of millions of active devices we monitor). The vast majority
(97%) of transactions relate to Coinhive.
We identify the same peaks in 2018-04 and 2018-05 in
this data source, coinciding with the Drupal vulnerability. A
sudden peak at the end of 2018-07 occurs only in this data
set, however. We have no compelling theory why this peak
appears only in this data source. Inspecting the transactions
manually, we confirm that they constitute increased download
activity of the Coinhive script.
Frequency of user exposure. Mining on resource-constrained
mobile devices is more detrimental to the browsing experience
than mining on desktop computers. We are interested how long
users are exposed, given that the authors of [6] claim that
deployed mining code remains on a site for several weeks.
Figure 3(b) shows the number of transactions and days that
users access mining-related domains. Most users access such
domains fewer than four times over six months. There is a
long tail (0.5% of users) who have more than 100 mining-
related transactions. We also observe that most users are only
affected for a couple of days over the entire period of six
months. Surprisingly, however, some users seem to access
mining domains very regularly: 90k users do so for seven or
more days and 14k access the domains for 90 days or more.
As we show now, this is because of a previously unknown
attack vector.
Unknown injection vector. Figure 3(c) plots the percentage
of actively mining devices per model. We compute this by
normalizing the number of unique devices accessing mining
domains with the total number of such devices in the network
over the same period. We only consider models with at least 50
unique active devices. We identify certain Android devices that
are much more prominent than others. All 56 Vinovo X6-05
devices active during this period access mining websites. 136
out of 164 Leagoo Lead 6 devices and 353 out of 613 Umidigi
London devices do so as well. Statistically, this is quite
unlikely, and hence we hypothesize that some process other
than normal user behavior causes the access. We survey the
Amazon product pages for the devices and find that although
they are very affordable, they are also equipped with relatively
powerful hardware. For example, the Umidigi London is a
quad-core, 5-inch smartphone with 1GB of RAM that cost
only $US 75 in 2018. Interestingly, many buyers complain in
reviews about advertisements appearing on the home screen.
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Apple and Android devices.Figure 3. Mobile ISP analysis.
Others notice background activity, especially when charging,
or applications that are installed without user interaction.
We buy one such device for testing purposes. A few
weeks after activation, the phone starts displaying pop-ups,
advertisements, and various apps are installed without user
intervention. Google recently reported the Triada malware
to have been injected into the supply chain for some of
our affected devices [16]. Triada is known to cause similar
behaviors. We test for the typical signatures identified by
Google; however, none of them are present in our firmware.
This suggests that our device is controlled in a different but
possibly related way. It may well be that the apps installed
without user permission load web sites in the background that
contain mining code. It is unclear if this is the intention behind
the installed apps or only a side-effect.4
C. Alternative Attack Vectors: Tampering with Connections
In line with our previous findings, we find few incidences
of open proxies or Tor exit nodes tampering with traffic for
the purpose of mining cryptocurrency.
Open proxies. Out of 15 892 proxies active and fast enough to
deliver a site within our 60 seconds timeout, only 282 (1.7%)
modify content. 6% of these proxies inject mining code, i.e.,
a total of 0.11% of the tested proxies. We verify manually
that each case is a true positive. All injections are related to
Coinhive. Figure 4 shows our results over time. We see most
mining activity from 2017-12 to 2018-03, which coincides
with the ramp-up phase of in-browser mining and higher
Monero prices. We never find more than ten proxies injecting
mining code at any time. As in our other data sources, we see a
decline beginning in mid-2018. We track whether proxies also
manipulate TLS certificates, i.e., stage a Person-in-the-middle
attack on HTTPS connections. We find a similar fraction of
proxies doing this—but when we inspect these cases, they are
never the same proxies that inject mining code into HTTP.
We measure how long proxies attempt code injection and
establish a median of 22 days. A similar number has been
reported for other malicious tampering by open proxies in [8].
It is also close to the number reported in [6] for websites
hosting mining code: a third stops the mining within two
4We make the firmware of our device available to interested researchers.
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Figure 4. Open proxy ecosystem and miners evolution.
weeks. The short duration during which injection of code by
proxies happens contrasts with the overall lifetime of proxies,
which spans months. One proxy, for example, is active for
about one year but only injects mining code for one month.
Injection in Tor. Our analysis of injections at Tor exit nodes
spans more than 200 days, with an average of 680 successful
downloads of the bait page per day. The number of exit nodes
in our measurement period is between 900 and 1100, although
not every exit node provides us with a result. This is due to the
way how onion circuits are created and the fact that exit nodes
set policies for exit traffic. We exclude exit nodes that do not
forward our HTTP requests. Although we use a very broad
range of keywords, we find only one Tor exit node injecting
mining code. This specific exit node injects an unobfuscated
Coinhive script. It is only active for 13 days, during which we
see the injection on four days. It is instructive to compare this
with previous results on content modification in exit nodes.
Winter et al. [15] found significant malicious behavior among
Tor exit nodes in 2014. The number of exit nodes has not
changed significantly since then, but Winter et al. found 40
exit nodes tampering with HTTPS connections and 27 exit
nodes stealing credentials from HTTP connections. However,
Tor has a tech-savvy user base likely to notice tampering. The
network now encourages users to report malicious exit nodes,
which can be flagged in the directory service. We believe that
Tor was hence never particularly appealing to attackers.
Table V
VISITS TO MINING SITES IDENTIFIED BY OUR BROWSER EXTENSION.
Month (2018) Total visits Visits to mining sites %
Feb 113 257 18 0.016%
Mar 206 518 33 0.016%
Apr 171 555 89 0.052%
May 153 256 53 0.034%
Jun 195 092 40 0.021%
(Jul) (160 373) (461) (0.287)%
D. Understanding User Visits to Mining Sites
We investigate the extent of mining experienced by users
of our browser extension. Note that it is configured in such a
way that any mining code we find must come from the visited
site as users cannot access malicious proxies.
We updated and extended the classifiers over time to ensure
coverage and accuracy. Table V summarizes our findings. Once
again, we find that users are very occasionally affected by
mining. Mining sites are rarely accessed by users: they account
for just 0.03% of the total number of domains our users visited.
We find the characteristic bumps in 2018-04 and 2018-05,
which coincide with the attacks on the Drupal content man-
agement system. This corroborates our previous results from
passive measurement. We notice a peak in 2018-07. However,
closer inspection reveals that this is an automated tool using
our plugin repeatedly to visit a miner domain. Such tools have
also been reported in [8]. The peak is hence not related to the
one we find in our ISP data. Coinhive is the most common
mining pool we encounter—we find it in 93% of sessions.
This is followed by Authedmine, JSECoin, Cryptoloot, and
Coinimp, attesting to the growing significance of alternative
providers.
We investigate the duration of HTTP sessions with and
without mining taking place. The median grows from six
seconds for regular sessions to 30 seconds when mining
occurs. This seems counter-intuitive as one would expect users
to be annoyed by high CPU usage. However, it is likely that
some mining sites offer attractive content, as also suggested
in [4], [9] (entertainment and adult content). However, most
sessions are too short to contribute significant mining results
to a mining pool: just 10% of mining sessions last more than
16 minutes.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we set out to analyze the exposure of Web
users to cryptocurrency mining. In a nutshell, do reported
deployment rates between 0.01–0.1% imply a great risk for
users or not? The conclusion that we offer is that the risk
to users was greatly overestimated. This is due to the nearly
exclusive use of active scans in previous work. In contrast to
previous work, our study is retrospective and longitudinal in
nature: we pool datasets raised by several groups around the
planet to paint a more comprehensive picture of user exposure.
In the following, we combine and discuss the results from our
various data sources in context.
Exposure was very low. All our measurements show users
were very rarely exposed to mining. We note that we verified
high coverage and accuracy for our classifiers. Our own active
scans, which provide some input to our passive observations,
are consistent with related work. An important take-away to
consider in future studies of Web attacks is the degree to which
the use of deployment numbers alone is a very insufficient
metric to express risk to users. The long-tail distribution of
browsing preferences must be accounted for to quantify risks
meaningfully. In our data, we were able to establish the long-
tail distribution for mining sites that users actually connect to.
Taking this into account, we believe that blocklists in browsers
or on network gateways were actually also more effective
than previous work gave them credit for; they should not be
dismissed.
Exposure was very short. The number of connections to
mining proxies alone do not reveal how users react to mining
sites, and whether there is any measurable contribution to a
pool’s overall mining. The data we obtain from our browser
extension gives us a unique perspective here. It corroborates
that users encounter mining very rarely but also shows that
most users stay briefly if they come across mining sites:
usually around 30 seconds. As revenue is a driving force in
the operations of cybercriminals, it is important to take this
into account when new, different attacks exploit users’ CPU
time.
Risk from software monoculture. The peaks in our passive
measurements correspond to compromises of a widely used
content management system. This should be taken as yet
another warning that software monocultures, combined with
the known slow update rates in the web ecosystem, put users
at risk too easily.
Uncommon attack vectors were tried. We expose one attack
vector that was hitherto unknown: mobile devices loading
apps that lead the devices to visit mining sites, possibly in
the background. While a relatively infrequent occurence, our
findings support the call for more stringent checks of operating
systems, including in supply chains.
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